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AUTOMOBILES-STATUTE VOIDING UNREGISTERED SALES-ACTION AGAINST
DEALER FOR INJURIES RECEIVED FROM PURCHASER.-A dealer sold a car
without any transfer of certificate of title and registration, in violation of
Mich. Acts 1923, No. 16, § 3, which made such a sale a crime, punishable
by fine or imprisonment. The purchaser, while driving the car, negligently
damaged the plaintiff's car. Suit was brought against the dealer and the
purchaser. The dealer alone defended and judgment was given for the
plaintiff. Held, on appeal, that the transaction in violation of the statute
was "void," and the dealer, still being the owner of the car, was therefore
responsible under Mich. Acts 1925, No. 287, § 11. Judgment affirmed.
Endres v. Marc-Rickenbacker Co., 219 N. W. 719 (Mich. 1928).
Statutes forbidding the sale of motor vehicles without registration and
transfer of the certificate of title by the seller and declaring the transac-
tion "void," or "unlawful," or "invalid," or a "crime," exist in most states,
their purpose being to prevent thefts. See HuDDY, AUTOMOBILE." (8th ed.
(1927) § 1097. Where the statute declares the transaction to be "void,"
courts have considered it mandatory and have held the transaction "void"
for all purposes. Quinn v. Gehlert, 291 S. W. .138 (Mo. 1927) (seller can
maintain replevin against buyer); Muzenich v. McCain, 220 Mo. App. 502,
274 S. W. 888 (1925) (seller can replevy from innocent third party); Milleri
v. Col. Underwriting Ins. Co., 117 Kan. 240, 230 Pac. 1030 (1924) (buyer
has no insurable interest). But where the statute does not expressly call
the transaction "void," courts, in the effort to determine the legislative In-
tent, have called the transaction void in some situations, but not in others.
Swank v. Moisan, 85 Ore. 662, 166 Pac. 962 (1917) (vendor cannot recover
on a note given in payment, but could replevy the machine); Curry v,. Iowa
Truck and Tractor Co., 193 Iowa 397, 187 N. W. 36 (1922) (vendee held
to have an action for damages for failure of vendor to deliver, but cannot
obtain delivery of possession); Ohio Farmers Ins. Co. v. Todino, 111 Ohio
St. 274, 145 N. E. 25 (1924) (vendee has no insurable interest). Thus a
bank check in part payment for a sale in violation of the statute has been
held unenforceable in the hands of the payee. Arotsky v. Kropnitzky, 98
N. J. L. 344, 120 Atl. 921 (1923). But in the same jurisdiction, a sub-
vendee has been permitted to sue for delivery of a bill of sale, withheld by
the original vendor on the ground that the sale was void. Gaub v. Moshcr,
129 Atl. 253 (N. J. 1925). And a suit by a vendee to rescind and re-
cover back the price has been allowed. Stein v. Scarpa, 96 N. J. L. 86, 114
AtI. 245 (1921). The court's interpretation of the legislative intent seems
to be the decisive factor. See Williams v. Stringfield, 76 Colo. 343, 231 Pac.
658 (1924). The resulting confusion could be eliminated by specific indica-
tion by the legislature of the transactions to which the statute is to apply.
The result of the instant decision, though logically sound, seems unneces-
sarily harsh.
BILLS AND NOTES-CONSIDERATION-NOTE GIVEN TO INCREASE BANi'S AP-
PARENT ASSETS.-The predecessor of the plaintiff bank was in financial
difficulty. Acting on the advice of the state bank examiner, it undertook
to eliminate from its books a so-called "expense account." A resolution was
passed imposing assessments on the shareholders to take up this account,
the shareholders to give notes which were to be carried as assets and re-
tired by the earnings. The bank was subsequently closed. After the re-
organization, the plaintiff bank recovered from the defendant shareholder
on one of these notes. Held, on appeal, that the note was given without con-
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sideration. Judgment reversed. Farmer's Bank v. Milk4r, 8 S. W. (2d)
92 (Mo. 1928).
There is ample authority for finding consideration in various bcnefitz ac-
cruing to the promisor under circumstances similar to those of the instant
case. Queensboro Nat. Bank v. Kelly, 220 App. Div. 515, 221 N. Y. Supp.
703 (2d Dep't 1927) (preservation of a going concern and prevention of
the impairment of capital); Stern v. McDonald, 47 Cal. App. 79, 190 Pae.
221 (1920) (continuing in business and incurring new obligations); Union
Bank of Brooklyn. v. Sullivan, 214 N. Y. 332, 10S N. E. 553 (1915) (bene-
fit to note-maker as shareholder); (1919) 28 Y,= L. J. 823. Con~rt:
Snouse v. Waterloo Say. Bank, 198 Iowa ;06, 199 N. W. 350 (1924). A
number of courts, also, have held that in such cases the promisor was
estopped to deny consideration, since the note was given to incrca-e the
bank's apparent assets, and thus to deceive depositors and the public.
Prudential Trust Co. v. Moore, 245 Mass. 311, 139 N. E. 645 (1923); Ccdar
State Bank v. Olson, 116 Kan. 320, 226 Pac. 995 (1924); Comment (1923)
32 YALE L. J. 730; see Note (1924) 38 HAVm. L. Rev. 239, 242. The cztoppel
theory would seem to apply more clearly where suit on the note was brought
by a receiver. Lyons v. Bcnney, 230 Pa. 117, 79 AtI. 250 (1011); Pt,!nau-
v. Chase, 106 Ore. 440,212 Pac. 365 (1923). But cf. Chicago Title and T;tnvt
Go. v. Brady, 165 Mo. 197, 65 S. W. 303 (1901) (holding that the rcceiver
has no greater rights than the bank). If it is granted that there was suffi-
cient consideration, then the resolution providing that the notes were to
be paid from the expected profits and not by the mahers, should have been
held inadmissible as varying the terms of a written instrument by parol.
Bank of Dexter v. Simmons, 204 S. W. 837 (Mo. App. 1913); Fir.at Nat.
Bank of Tulsa v. Boxley, 264 Pac. 134 (Okla. 1927); 4 WiGmorx, Evmmsec
(1905) § 2444. The instant decision would seem to encourage an undeir-
able practice. The court on the instant facts might well have found cum-
cient consideration in the mutual promises of the several note-maherz. Cf.
Globe Wernicke Co. v. Siegel Myers School of Mtwsic, 209 Inl. App. 529
(1918) (mutual promises by several creditors to extend time of suit);
Cohen v. Harding Const. Co., 41 R. I. 242, 103 Atl. 702 (1918) (relinquish-
ment of part of each creditor's claim); 1 WILLISTON, CoNT. MCs (1920) §
126.
CONFLICT OF LAWS-PENAL STATUTES-ETRA-TsERuTorIAL ExNF0rtemIENT.
-The plaintiff brought suit in Connecticut under the Massachusetts death
statute allowing damages of p500 to $10,000, depending upon the "degree
of culpability" of the defendant. The lower court denied recovery. Held,
on appeal, that the statute was not penal in the "international sense."
Judgment reversed. C rstilly jv. Warner, 87 Conn. 461, 88 Atl. 711 (1913),
overruled. Daury v. Ferrara, Conn. Supreme Court of Errors (June tcrm
1928).
Prior to 1892, a statute permitting recovery of more than actual compen-
sation was generally considered penal, and therefore inoperative to give
rise to a cause of action outside of the enacting state. Gooneucu, CONFLICT
OF LAws (1927) 12. The United States Supreme Court changed this rule
for the federal courts by declaring that a law is penal "in the international
sense" only if the wrong sought to be redressed is a wrong to the public
as distinguished from an injury to the individual. Huntington -. Attril!,
146 U. S. 657, 13 Sup. Ct. 224 (1892); cf. Huntington v. Attril, [1893] A.
C. 150. Under this test, the forum will not entertain a suit by another state
for the recovery of a pecuniary penalty imposed for violation of a public
duty. Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U. S. 20, S Sup. Ct. 1370 (1833).
Nor a suit by a common informer in a qui tam action. Cf. Colc v. Groves,
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134 Mass. 471 (1883). But an individual may sue for a wrong to himself,
though more than actual damage is recoverable. James-Dickinson Farm
Mortgage Co. v. Harry, 273 U. S. 119, 47 Sup. Ct. 308 (1927) (exemplary
damages); Atchison Ry. v. Nichols, 264 U. S. 348, 44 Sup. Ct. 353
(1924) (arbitrary amount); Coryell v. Atchison Ry., 273 Mo. 361, 201 S.
W. 77 (1918) (penalty in addition to actual damages). The decided trend
of authority is toward endorsement of the federal rule. Wellman v. Mead,
93 Vt. 322, 107 At. 396 (1918), overruling Adams v. Fitchburg R. R., 67
Vt. 76, 30 Atl. 687 (1894) ; Great Western Machinery Co. v. Smith, 87 Ian.
331, 124 Pac. 414 (1912) ; Loucks v. Standard Oil Coo., 224 N. Y. 99, 120 X.
E. 198 (1918). Contra: McLay v. Slade, 48 R. I. 357, 138 Atl. 212 (1927);
(1928) 26 MicH. L. REV. 325. Under these decisions it would seem that the
rule that one state will not enforce the penal laws of another has been
effectually abrogated as regards suits by individuals for personal injuries.
The result, however, in so far as it increases the number of obligations
which may be enforced between the states, seems highly desirable. Comment
(1914) 23 YALE L. J. 538. The concurrence of judicial decision on this
point, though it involve the overruling of former decisions, as in the in-
stant case, is equally commendable from the standpoint of uniformity.
Beach, Uniform Interstate Enforcement of Vested Rights (1918) 27 YAME
L. J. 656.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-CLAImI AGAINST STATE FOUNDED UPON MORAL OB-
LIGATioN.-Under a legislative appropriation necessitating a reduction of
employees, the state comptroller wrongfully discharged the claimant, who
was entitled under the rules of civil service to retain his position. The
claimant instituted mandamus proceedings and was reinstated. The legig-
lature subsequently passed an act authorizing the Court of Claims to hear
and determine-his claim against the state for counsel fees and disburse-
ments incurred in securing such reinstatement. The claimant had judg-
ment. Held, on appeal, that the legislature may authorize a recovery
founded upon a moral obligation. Judgment affirmed. Farrington v. State,
248 N. Y. 112, 161 N. E. 438 (1928).
Any appropriation of public money, to be constitutional, must be for a
public purpose. Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655 (U. S. 1874) (uncon-
stitutional to lend money to a privately owned bridge factory) ; Crawford
v. Imperial Irr. Dist., 200 Cal. 318, 253 Pac. 726 (1927) (employment to
influence legislation constitutional where no personal; secret, or sinister
influence used); Lowell v. Boston, 111 Mass. 454 (1873) (unconstitutional
to lend money to private property owners to rebuild after disastrous fire);
Kilpatrick v. Compensation Claim Board, 259 S. W. 164 (Tex. Civ. App.
1924) (constitutional to compensate cotton growers forbidden to plant in
effort to stamp out boll weevil) ; N. Y. CONST., art. 8, § 9. It is unnecessary
to obtain legislative authorization in New York to prosecute a private claim
against the state, where there is legal responsibility. The state permits
itself to be sued in the Court of Claims in such cases. N. Y. CODE CIV.
PROC. § 264; see Borchard, Government Liability in Tort (1924) 34 YALE
L. J. 1, 10. But where the claim would not be legally enforceable even if
the state were subject to suit, a recovery is conditional upon a special legis-
lative enabling act. Sherlock v. State, 198 App. Div. 494, 191 N. Y. Supp.
412 (3d Dep't 1921), aff'd, 235 N. Y. 515, 139 N. E. 716 (1923). Claims
of the latter type were once recognized in New York if founded on equity
and justice, or on gratitude and charity. Town of Guilford v. Supervisors of
Chenango County, 13 N. Y. 143 (1855). Gratitude and charity no longer
are grounds for legislative appropriations. Cf. Cayuga County v. State,
112 Misc. 517, 133 N. Y. Supp. 646 (Ct. Cl. 1920). A claim which involves
a payment of public money to a private individual, must, in order to be
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valid, be based on a moral obligation connected with the public intcret.
Wheeler v. State, 190 N. Y. 406, 83 N. E. 54 (1907) (recovery when state
received money for land, title to which proved defective) ; State v. Board
of Trustees, 192 Alo. App. 583, 184 S. W. 929 (1915) (no recovery of pen-
sion by wife of fireman killed in private quarrel while off duty); Mills v.
Stewart, 76 Mont. 429, 247 Pac. 332 (1926) (recovery by student for in-
juries received at state university due to negligence of those in charge of
university); Munro v. State, 223 N. Y. 208, 119 N. E. 444 (1918) (recovery
for injuries received from insane person worldng with claimant on stato
road); Lo-rich v. State, 113 Misc. 409, 184 N. Y. Supp. 313 (Ct. Cl. 1920)
(recovery for wound when soldiers fired on crowd without cause) ; Cavrlicr
v. State, 132 Misc. 182, 229 N. Y. Supp. 235 (Ct. Cl. 1923) (no recovery
by assemblyman of costs of defense against charge of criminal libI).
The recognition of the claim in the instant case is in accord with the
present trend of decisions.
CONTRACTS--DAmAGES-RECOVERY ron PAnT PrFon,,zxCc-WViL-UL
,BANDONIIENT.-A building contractor agreed to construct a concrete side-
walk. After doing work valued at about one-third of the contract price,
he wilfully abandoned the contract. The contractor sued to recover the
reasonable value of his work and had judgment in the lower ciurt. HA,
on appeal, that as a wilful contract breaker, the plaintiff could recovcr
nothing. Judgment reversed. Kellcy ,. Han ce, 142 Atl. 633 (Conn. 1923).
A building contractor who has substantially performed may recover the
contract price, less the damages sustained by his failure strictly to perform.
Atkinson v. Jackson Bros., 270 S. W. 843 (Tex. Comm. App. 1925); Hajeu
v. Razsey, 217 N. W. SOS (Iowa 1923); Note (1925) '33 A. L. R. 1333.
In such cases when the defects are remediable without reconstructing a
substantial part of the building, the contractor may recover the contract
price less the expense of making the work conform to specifications. Hot!
lingsworth v. Leachville Special School Dist., 157 Ark. 4"0, 219 S. W. 214
(1923); Valente v. Porto, 93 Conn. 653, 119 Atl. 838 (1923). Vhcre the
defects can be remedied only by rebuilding a substantial portion of the
structure, and the cost is out of proportion to the resulting b-nefit, the
owner may deduct from the contract price the difference in value as it is,
from its value if built according to specifications. Jacob & Yo-?q3 v. Kent,
230 N. Y. 239, 129 N.E. 889 (1921); White ,. Mitchell, 123 Wash. 60, 213
Pac. 10 (1923). Contra: Munro v. Butt, 8 El. & B1. 733 (1S5M). On the
other hand, where the contractor's deviation was wilful, the owner is en-
titled to deduct the cost of making the work conform to ,pccification,
whether he actually remedies it or not. Sincdlcy v. Wtalkn, 246 Mav. 393,
141 N. E. 281 (1923). Similarly, where the performance i, not sub-Aantial,
a distinction in recovery has been based on whether the abandonment was
wilful or in good faith. Pinches v. Swedish Charch, 51 Conn. 183, 10 Atl.
264 (1887) (abandonment by mistake in good faith; recovery allowed of
value minus difference between present value and contract price); Micr
v. Yockley, 49 Colo. 303, 112 Pac. 772 (1911) (wilful abandonment, no r,-
covery). It has been argued that to permit one to rceovLr in quantum
meruit despite a wilful breach would encourage abandonment. WooDwr, ,
QuAsr-CoN-ReAcrs (1913) §§ 166-175; EENErt, QuASI-CoNTM R~c (1=93)
225. Such would probably not be the result if the wilful contract brcaher
is held to strict accountability for damagfs catued by his briach, re ohving
all doubtful issues against him. To deny recovery penalizes most the con-
tract breaker who has given the greatest measure of performance. (192T)
36 YA L. J. 530. Recovery in quantum meruit, less full compenzatory
damages, would seem preferable to such forfEitures, irrespective of the
builder's state of mind.
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CONTRACTS-STATUTE OF FRAUDS-EARNEST.-The defendant's counter-
claim to an action for goods sold set forth an oral contract whereby the
plaintiff agreed to extend credit to the defendant in the sum of $25,000 if
the defendant would furnish a guaranty in the sum of $15,000. The guar-
anty was delivered but the plaintiff later refused further credit. The lower
court awarded damages to the defendant on the counterclaim. B'cfld, on
appeal, that the delivery of the guaranty did not constitute "earnest" so
as to take the contract for the sale of goods out of the Statute of Frauds.
Judgment reversed. Michelin Tire Co. v. Williams, 268 Pac. 56 (Ore. 1928).
The disjunctive "or" in the Statute of Frauds implies a difference between
"earnest" and "part payment." The modern cases, however, seem to make
the terms synonymous. Groomer v. McMillan, 143 Mo. App. 612; 128 S. W.
285 (1910) ; see DeWaal v. Jamison, 176 App. Div. 766, 758, 163 N. Y. Supp.
1045, 1046 (1st Dep't 1917) ; WILLISTON, SALES (2d ed. 1924) § 97. But of.
BENJAMIN, SALES (6th ed. 1920) 255 (distinction made in Roman law).
Apparently, on this theory, the placing of forfeit money in the hands of
third parties has been held not to be "earnest." Howe v. Hayward, 108
Mass. 54 (1871); Jennings & Silvey v. Dunham, 60 Mo. App. 635 (1895).
Some courts have said that even if "earnest" is distinct from "part pay-
ment," it must have some "value." See K'ohn v. Bantz, 68 Ind. 277, 284
(1879); Coleman v. St. Paul & Tacoma Lumber Co., 110 Wash. 259, 269,
188 Pac. 532, 536 (1920) ; BROWNE, STATUTE OF FRAUDS (5th ed. 1895) 462.
And "value" seems not to be easily found. Cf. Hewson v. Poterman Mfg.
Co., 76 Wash. 600, 136 Pac. 1158 (1913) (resigning a position not "earnest"
to enforce a sale of shares); Wenger v. Grummel, 136 Md. 80, 110 Atl. 206
(1920) (no "earnest" in giving of seeds for use in production when not so
used); Walker v. Nussey, 16 l. & W. 302 (1847) (charging off due debt
not "earnest"). In cases where "value" has been attributed to something
other than money the "earnest" seems actually to have been a part of the
contract price. Kuhns v. Gates, 92 Ind. 66 (1883) (giving of colt to be
exchanged for mare upon payment of additional money); Weir v. Hudnut,
115 Ind. 525, 18 N. E. 24 (1888) (furnishing of sacks by buyer with con-
sequent reduction in purchasing price). But of. Sumner & Leit'cslcy v.
Brown & Co., 25 T. L. R. 745 (1909). (where bags were sent merely to
facilitate performance to the contract). By analogy with a recent case
dealing with "part payment," it might seem that the concept of earnest
should admit of more liberal interpretation. Cf. Ablett Co. v. Sencer, 130
Misc. 416, 224 N. Y. Supp. 251 (City Ct. N. Y. 1927).
CORPORATIONS-SHARE CERTIFIATES-NEGOTIABILITY.-The defendant
without notice accepted in pledge for a new loan share certificates stolen
from the plaintiff, who brought suit to restrain the defendants from trans-
ferring the certificates. The lower court refused to grant an injunction.
Held, on appeal, that the injunction was properly refused. Turnbull v.
Longacre Bank, 249 N. Y. 159, 163 N. E. 135 (1928).
Prior to the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, share certificates enjoyed only
the status of most contracts so far as transferability by endorsement and
delivery was concerned. Johnston v. Laflin, 103 U. S. 800 (1880) (certifi-
cates); Bates v. Richard's Lumber Co., 56 Minn. 14 (1893) (simple con-
tract). Contrary to the rule governing negotiable instruments and
similar to that governing chattels, the original owner could recover blank
indorsed share certificates from an innocent purchaser for value from a
thief. Knox v. Eden Musee American Co., 148 N. Y. 441 (1896) (stolen
certificate recovered); Note (1924) 52 A. L. R. 947; Goodwin v. Jacnzer,
122 Tenn. 101, 119 S. W. 1133 (1909). In the absence of estoppel an as-
signee of shares received no better title than that of his assignor, nor was
390
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the stock freed from equities in favor of third persons. Weaver v. Bzrd :, 49
N. Y. 286 (1872) ; Hcrran z,. Gray, 16S Mass. 573 (1S97). By strcZ"ing etop-
pel, indicia of ownership, or apparent authority, it appears that courtz in
comparable situations were as quick to protect the purchaser of goods as the
purchaser of share certificates. Bank of Tupdlo -e. Thomp.on, 106 Ala.
600, 65 So. 147 (1914) (partnership with restricted authority to pledge
certificates exceeded authority. Bona fide purchaser protected); Sid,:th v.
Clews, 105 N. Y. 283 (18S7) (buyer of diamonds, left with diamond mer-
chant to be shown, protected). Contra: Leri v. Booth, 53 Md. 305 (1882).
A purchaser of a chattel for value without notice took free from the orig-
inal seller's liens created by contract as did such a purchaser of certificates
endorsed in blank. Just v. State Sarings Ban: of Ionia, 132 Mich. 600, 94
N. W. 200 (1903) (bona fide purchaser of certificate from corporation's
debtor protected despite by-law prohibiting transfer); iKcim v. Coz-, 167
Ala. 639, 52 So. 401 (1910) (sale of mule on approval, vendee disapproved
but sold to bona fide purchaser who was protected). In the absence of enabling
statutes the assignee of certificates could sue in his own name, though
the assignee of a chose in action could not. Sargent v. Franklib In. Co.,
8 Pick. 90 (Mass. 1829) (share certificate); Skincr v. Sowes, 14 Mass. 107
(1817) (chose in action). A number of courts have held that receiving
chattels in payment of a pre-existing debt did not constitute the holder a
purchaser for value. Kops Bros. Co. v. Smith, 137 Mich. 28, 100 N.
W. 169 (1904); WILLISTON, SALMS (2d. ed. 1924) § 620. Yet 2ome of there
courts have held that receiving share certificates in payment of a pre-
existing debt did constitute the holder a purchaser for value, by analogy
to the rule governing negotiable instruments. Cuba Colony Co. v. Kirby,
149 Mich. 453, 112 N. W. 1133 (1907). Contra: Commonwealth Nat. Bank;
v. Shriver, 275 Fed. 12 (C. C. A. 4th, 1921). Thus it could not be zaid that
share certificates were or were not treated as negotiable instruments for
all purposes. The construction of the Act in the principal case is fortunate,
in view of business practice, in protecting the innocent purchaser for value
of stolen share certificates-according to share certificates an attribute of
negotiable bills and notes which they have heretofore not enjoyed. Cf.
(1928) 27 MIcH. L. Rnv. 93.
CORPORATIONS-SHAREHOLDER'S SUIT TO ENFORCE ConroATE RIGHTms-
S dominated the X, Y and Z corporations, of which he was president. Through
his control of the board of directors of the Z corporation, he obtained a
loan for the X corporation, which had no tangible assets, secured by a
collateral pledge of shares of the Y corporation which had no cash value.
With the proceeds he purchased shares of the Z corporation. The complain-
ant, a shareholder in the Z corporation, made a demand upon the directors
to take action against S to cancel the shares created, and upon their refusal
to act, he filed a bill in equity against S to enforce the corporate rights of
the Z corporation, which he joined as a party defendant. The lower court
concluded that the share certificates held by S were issued without con-
sideration and decreed that they be cancelled. Held, on appeal, that the
decree be affirmed. Sohland v. Baker, 141 Atl. 277 (Del. 1927).
It is well settled that a shareholder cannot maintain an action at law
to enforce a right belonging to the corporation. United Copper Securiftci
Go. v. Awalgamated Copper Co., 244 U. S. 261, 37 Sup. Ct. 509 (1917).
Contra: Equitdble Trust Co. v,. Columbia Nat. Ban!:, 145 S. C. 91, 142 S.
E. 811 (1928) (questionable decision). But under certain circumstances,
where the corporation cannot be expected to act, a shareholder may sue in
equity to enforce corporate rights in his own name, joining the corpora-
tion as a party defendant. BALLANTINE, PRIVATE CoapornA'ToNS (1927) §
184; Glenn, The Stock-holders Suit-Coporate and Individual Gricvancea
392 YALE LAW JOURNAL
(1924) 33 YALE L. J. 580. The power to bring such representative actions
is not limited to holders of common share certificates. Osann v. Jones, 204
N. Y. Supp. 242, 209 App. Div. 9 (2d Dep't 1924) (preferred non-voting
shareholder); Holmes v. Camp, 167 N. Y. Supp. 840, 180 App. Div. 409
(1st Dep't 1917) (suit by shareholder of holding company on behalf of
subsidiary). Such suits have been allowed to set aside a fraudulent transac-
tion entered into by the corporation. Bentley v. Zelma Oil Co., 76 01da.
116, 184 Pac. 131 (1919) (sale of oil lease); Anderson v. Johnson, 45 R. 1.
17, 119 Atl. 642 (1923) (shares created as bonus to promoters). And to
compel the repayiment of moneys wrongfully diverted from the corporate
treasury. Guay v. Holland System Hull Co., 244 Mass. 240, 138 N. l-. 557
(1923) (funds used for, benefit of another corporation) ; Godley v'. Crandall
& Godley Co., 212 N. Y. 121, 105 N. E. 818 (1914) (salaries illegally voted
to directors). A shareholder's suit will lie to prevent .a threatened injury
to the corporation. Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 331 (U. S. 1855) (suit to
enjoin collection of taxes) ; Morton v. Morton Realty Go., 41 Idaho 729, 241
Pac. 1014 (1925) (suit to enjoin directors from misusing corporate prop-
erty). Likewise a shareholder may intervene in a suit to which the corpo-
ration is a party when the interests of the corporation are not properly
represented. Manahan v. Petroleum Producing & Refining Co., 189 N. Y.
Supp. 127, 198 App. Div. 192 (1st Dep't 1921) (fraudulent confession of
judgment); Crowe v. Hamilton Nat. Bank, 74 Colo. 407, 222 Pac. 394
(1924) (foreclosure of mortgaged corporate property). In the usual case
the corporation may be said to be hostile to the claim, but by the authority
of the instant case, a remedy will lie where the corporation, although
not hostile to the claim, refuses to enforce it.
CRIIIINAL LAW-MANSLAUGHTER-OWNER PERMITTING INTOXICATED F RIEND
To DRIvE AuTo.-The decedent was fatally injured in a collision
with the defendant's automobile, occupied by the defendant and an un-
identified companion, who was driving. The evidence sufficiently estab-
lished that both were intoxicated and that the driver's conduct was so
"reckless and unlawful" as to require his conviction for manslaughter as
a matter of law. The defendant was held guilty as a principal in the
crime. Held, on appeal (two judges dissenting), that the judgment be
affirmed. State v. Hopkins, 147 Wash. 198, 265 Pac. 481 (1928).
The necessity of protecting the public against the increasing hazards of
the automobile has forced the courts to fit new offenses into the ancient
categories of crime. Charges under the original reckless driving statutes
have been superseded by convictions for assault and battery. State V.
Schutte, 87 N. J. L. 15, 93 At]. 112 (1915); Tilt v. State, 17 Ga. App. 663,
88 S. E. 41 "(1916). But cf. Davis v. Commonwealth, 143 S. E. 641 (Va.
1928). In certain jurisdictions -where the penalty for mere assault is no
more severe than that for reckless driving, charges against drivers of
assaults with specific intent are employed. Chambliss v. State, 37 Ga. App.
124, 139 S. E. 80 (1927) (intent to murder); People v. Benson, 321 Il.
605, 152 N. E. 514 (1926) (intent to inflict serious bodily injury). Contra:
State v. Richardson, 179 Iowa 770, 162 N. W. 28 (1917). And the courts
no longer hesitate to convict drivers of manslaughter. Not, (1928) 53
A. L. R. 254. Where the driver is intoxicated, one court has held that it
will not even investigate the issue of negligent conduct. Keller v. State,
156 Tenn. 633, 299 S. W. 803 (1927); cf. People v. Kelly, 70 Cal. App.
519, 234 Pac. 110 (1925) (speed immaterial). The instant case takes a
further step in holding the owner, a passenger, guilty of manslaughter.
Cf. Story v. United States, 16 F. (2d) 342 (Ct. of App. D. C. 1926); EX
parte Liotard, 47 Nev. 169, 217 Pac. 960 (1923); Moreland v. State, 164 Ga.
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467, 139 S. E. 77, aff'd, 139 S. E. 361 (1927). Apparently only firzt dfca
murder remains unaffected by this development. Cf. State v. Trott, 190 N.
C. 674, 130 S. E. 627 (1925) (owner convicted of second degree murder).
The established criminal categories are obviously unfitted for thcZe new
problems. Tulin, The Role of Penalties iz C4idi~zal Lazo (192S) 37 YAIM
L. J. 1048. The vagueness of the usual legalistic terms leads to a con-
fused and artificial labelling of particular conduct to fit the crime charged.
Moreland v. State, supra at 472, 139 S. E. at 79 ("intentional neglct");
State v. Trott, &tpra at 680, 130 S. E. at 630 ("malignant rcclleezsnC-" and
"implied malice"); Commoinwzoalth i,. ShEria,, 191 Mass. 49, 441, 73
N. E. 98, 99 (1906) (owner's "control" over the driver and a "prima
facie case of participation against him"). In the instant case the majority
speaks of the "intent to do an unlawful or grossly negligent act." The
dissent was grounded on the impossibility of aiding and abetting the d.ing
of an "unintentional and involuntary act." The question is simply whcther
such defendants should be punished and to what extent. (1928) 41 HArnv.
L. REv. 669. The expression by the courts of this problem and of the
need for severe penalties as a deterrent would at least clarify the citua-
tion. Tulin, op. cit. s2 pra. And legislative action, categorically grouping
the various degrees of automobile crimes and fixing appropriate penalties
would seem to be the most satisfactory solution.
CmiixniAxL PR0CEDTRn-JuRoRS--CHALNGE FR CAUSC.-The defendant
was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. The trial court had
refused to allow a challenge to a juror for cause. By statute [FL,.
GEN. LAws (Skillman, 1927) § 4359] the juror was disqualificd by a
remote relationship with the dqfendazt's counsel. The defendant had
peremptory challenges at the time of disallowance, which he later exhausted.
Held, on appeal, by an equally divided court, that it was an error for such a
juror to serve. Judgment reversed. Padgett v. State, 116 So. 1s (Ma.
1928).
If peremptory challenges remain on impanelling the jury, an erroneous
ruling on the defendant's challenge for cause will not warrant rcverzal.
State v. Albano, 119 Ale. 472, 111 Atl. 753 (1920) (where objectionable
juror served, defendant said to have waived the injury); Roger:; v. State,
3 S. W. (2d) 455 (Tex. Cr. App. 1927) (where he did not serve, held
harmless error); see Note, AN.N. Cus. 1915D 97, 99. And where the
defendant's peremptory challenges were exhausted at the time of im-
panelling the jury, the tendency seems to be not to revcrze, in the ablenca
of a showing that the jury was prejudiced. Baher v. State, 8S Wis. 140,
59 N. W. 570 (1894); State v. Klhii2, 97 Conn. 321, 116 Ati. 596 (1922).
But there is reversible error if a prejudiced juror is forced on the de-
fendant. State v. Collier, 161 La. 856, 109 So. 516 (1926). In come
instances all doubt as to a juror's prejudice is resolved in favor of the
defendant. Middleton v. State, 16 Okla. Cr. 320, 1S3 Pac. 626 (1919).
But generally the discretion of the trial court will not be interferred
with. State v. Dzz, 161 La. 531, 109 So. 56 (1926); Ethridge v. State,
163 Ga. 186, 136 S. E. 72 (1926). Where peremptory challenges remain
at the time of an erroneous refusal of a challenge for cause, but are
exhausted before the panel is complete, a waiver of the error has been
found. People v,. Sla??ghtc;, 33 Cal. App. 365, 165 Pac. 44 (1917) (situa-
tion parallel to that of the instant case, though disqualifying facts differ).
The generally prevailing tendency to allow wide discretion in the rulings
of the trial court, and the consequent refusal of appellate courts to
find abuse of that discretion without strong cause seem justified to avoid
delay in criminal trials on purely technical grounds. Cf. Car'tel -e. Statc,
45 Tex. Cr. 430, 76 S. W. 437 (1903). In the absence of proof of
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prejudice, the rule of waiver might well lead to an opposite conclusion
in the instant case.
ExTRADrrioN-PowER OF EXECUTIVE TO SURRENDER FUGITIVE HEsw
UNDER PROCESS OF COUR.-The petitioner, on parole by court order, fol-
lowing a conviction for felony, was arrested under a requisition warrant
honoring a demand to surrender him to another state to answer for
an offense committed there. Proceedings in habeas corpus were instituted
in the asylum state. Held, on demurrer, that the writ be denied, since
the custody of the court became constructive when the prisoner was re-
leased on parole and the executive had power to waive such custody by
honoring the requisition. Ex Parte Middaugh, 268 Pac. 321 (Okla. Cr. App.
1928).
Statutes in a number of jurisdictions provide that there may be no
surrender of a fugitive, where criminal proceedings are pending against
him, until the'proceedings have been determined by acquittal or by com-
pletion of the sentence. GA. ANN. PENAL CODE (Michie, 1926) § 1354;
ORE. LAWS (Olson, 1920) § 1874; VA. CODE ANN. (1919) § 5067. Under
such statutes a sentence is not completed where a prisoner has been re-
leased on parole within the asylum state. Carpenter v. Lord, 88 Ore.
128, 171 Pac. 577 (1918); of. Von Walden v. Geddes, 105 Conn. 374, 135
Atl. 396 (1926) (paroled individual residing in a third state; no statute
controlling). But in the absence of controlling statute the governor
has power to honor the requisition when a fugitive has been released
on bail pending a prosecution. State v. Eberstein, 105 Neb. 833, 182 N.
W. 500 (1921); Note (1926) 42 A. L. R. 585. Contra: Ex Parte Hobbs,
32 Tex. Cr. 312, 22 S. W. 1035 (1893). Similarly as to a release on
bail pending an appeal from conviction. People v. Hagan, 34 Misc. 85,
69 N. Y. Supp. 475 (Sup. Ct. 1901). Query whether the opposite result
would be reached were there incarceration pending a prosecution or an
appeal. If the fugitive is actually serving a sentence the executive has
no power to surrender him. Opinion of Justices, 201 Mass. 609, 89 N.
E. 174 (1909) (advisory opinion instituted by governor). But see Stato
v. Saunders, 288 Mo. 640, 651, 232 S. W. 973, 976 (1921) ; (1922) 6 MINN.
L. REv. 75. Once the fugitive has been surrendered the courts
of the demanding state will not consider whether the governor had power
to honor the demand. People v. Klinger, 319 Ill. 275, 149 N. E. 799
(1925); In re Hess, 5 Kan. App. 763, 48 Pac. 596 (1897). The considera-
tion in the instant case, of custody as constructive rather than actual,
though a novel approach to the problem, seems to lead to the commendable
result of obviating delay in bringing criminals to justice.
EQUITY-JURISDICTION-REQUIREMENT OF A RES IN CONSTRUCTIVE SERVICE.
-The defendant, a resident of Delaware, and creditor of a Delaware
corporation having property in Iowa, sent to the latter's corporate trustee
in New York four past due non-negotiable notes, as evidence of default
under a 'deed of trust. The trustee failed to return these notes, and
the plaintiff, a creditor of the defendant, attached them in New York and
secured a judgment on constructive service. He was appointed a receiver
to collect the notes and brought proceedings to recover upon the com-
pany's property in Iowa. The lower court set aside the New York judg-
ment for want of jurisdiction. Held, on appeal, that the decree be affirmed,
as the notes transferred to New York were not "property" of the de-
fendant in that state. Seligmann v. Mills, 25 F. (2d) 807 (C. C. A. 8th,
1928).
Whether bonds, notes or share certificates may be regarded as a res
for in rem proceedings by reason of the fact that the physical paper
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is within the state, has caused the courts much difficulty. Pinncy v.
Nevills, 86 Fed. 97 (C. C. D. Blass. 1SOS) (held not to be "property");
Simpson v. Jersey City Contracting Co., 165 N. Y. 193, 58 N. E. 890
(1900) (held "property"); Blake v. Foreman Bro!. Banking Co., 218
Fed. 264 (N. D. Ill. 1914) scmble; Carpenter, Jirsdiction Over Dcbts for
the P.rpose of Administration, Garnishmcnt and Taxation (1917) 31
IHARv. L. REv. 905; Comment (1924) 34 YuxA L. J. 652. Inasmuch as
these documents are looked upon from the standpoint of busine3s as in-
struments of value, they are frequently regarded as articles of "prop-
erty," rather than as mere evidences of contractual relations which they
embody. Manning -. Berdan, 132 Fed. 3S2 (C. C. D. N. J. 1904) (negoti-
able instrument held to be "property"); Beale, The E;x'creis of Jrri'etdfqa
in Rem to Compel the Payment of a Debt (1913) 27 MLv. L. 1RV. 107.
The analogy as to what constitutes "property" for purposes of taxation
is sometimes employed by the courts in determining whether a given chose
in action represented by a writing may be regarded as "property" for
purposes of attachment, as is done in the instant case. Cf. Title Ix:. & Tr.
Co. v. Northwestern Telephone Co., SB Ore. 666, 173 Pac. 251 (1918).
It would seem, nevertheless, that the determination of taability of "prop-
erty" should not necessarily control in the matter of attachment. Cf.
Carpenter, op. cit. supra. The exercise of jurisdiction in rem in attach-
ment cases grew up on the assumption "that the public keeps in touch
with what is published in the newspapers in the places where its in-
terests are." See Redzinta v. Provident Inrt. for Savings, 9G N. J. Eq.
346, 353, 125 At. 133, 136 (1924); Comment (1924) 34 Y., L. J. 652.
If in the instant case the notes involved had been negotiable, and had
remained in New York with the consent of the owner, the in rem pro-
ceedings there had would have been recognized elsewhere. Cf. Merri t
-v. Ara. Steel Barge Co., 79 Fed. 228 (C. C. A. Sth, 1897) (New York
judgment in rem against share certificate recognized in Minnesota). Co. i-
FLIcT OF LAws RESTATEMiENT (Am. L. Inst. 1926) § 56. It has becn said
that there would be no jurisdiction if the "property" were not there with
the consent of the owner, although there appears to be no clear authority
in favor of that proposition. Ibid. § 52; see Co nTmm X.ns o:z Co:W.,iGr
op LAws RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1926) § 52. Non-nrgotiable notcz,
it -would seem, are generally regarded not as independent things of value,
but merely as evidence of contractual relations, which cannot apparently
become "property" or the subject of a suit in rem. Cf. Lawrence v.
Times Printing Co., 90 Fed. 24 (D. Wash. 1898) ("news franchise" held
to be a mere contract and contracts not to be "property"). The inxitant
decision would seem to be in accord, as the notes were non-negotiable,
and the court apparently found no consent to their remaining in New
York.
FUTUm INTERrSTs--PowERs OF Apro~rnNT.--A testatrix had exer-
cised a general power of appointment by will over property ve.ted in
trustees. In a suit by the trustees for instructions as to the disposition
of the property, the executor of the testatrix interposed a claim on the
ground that the estate was insolvent. Held, that assuming the estate to
be insolvent, the executor's claim be disallowed, as such appointed prop-
erty was not subject to the claims of creditors of the testatrix. Rhode
Island Hospital Tnst Co. v. Anthony, 142 Atl. 531 (R. I. 1928).
It is well settled in England and in most jurisdictions in this country
that, when a donee of a general power exercises it in favor of a volunteer,
the appointee takes the estate subject to the claims of creditors of the
donee. Bainton v. Ward, 2 Atk. 172 (1741); Clapp v. Ingraham, 126
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Mass. 200 (1879); Freeman v. Butters, 94 Va. 406, 26 S. E. 845 (1897).
Contra: Humphrey v. Campbell, 59 S. C. 39, 37 S. E. 26 (1900); see
Wales v. Bowdish, 61 Vt. 23, 30, 17 Atl. 1000, 1001 (1888). In support
of this doctrine it is said that equity considers the appointed property
as that of the donee, since he could dispose of it as he pleased. See
Johnson v. Cushing, 15 N. H. 298, 314 (1844). But this is qualified in
that the donee's own estate must be exhausted befire any of the appointed
property can be reached. Tuell v. Hurley, 206 Mass. 65, 91 N. E, 1013
(1910) ; Fleming v. Buchanan, 3 DeG. M. & G. 976 (1853). Until the power
of appointment is exercised the ultimate interest is in the donor, his
heirs, or the person entitled to take in default of appointment. 1 TIFFANY,
REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1920) § 315. Hence, if the power is not executed,
the creditors of the donee will not be permitted to seize the property in
satisfaction of their claiins. Holmes v. Coghill, 12 Ves. 206 (1806). Nor
can they compel the donee to exercise the power in their favor. Gilman
v. Bell, 99 Ill. 144 (1881). But execution of the power defeats the rights
of those who take on default of appointment even though, for any rea-
son, the appointee cannot take. The appointed property then becomes part
of the donee's estate. GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (3d ed. 1915)
§ 540a. Since the appointee in the instant case is a volunteer, his posi-
tion being no better than if the donee had appointed to himself and con-
veyed to the volunteer, he should not be preferred to the prejudice
of the donee's creditors. See Simes, The Devolution of Title to Appointed
Property (1928) 22 ILL. L. REv. 480. That the trend is definitely away
from the position taken in the instant case is indicated by statutes which
have gone beyond the majority rule in allowing creditors of the donee
to reach the property even before appointment. 30 STAT. 565 (1898),
11 U. S. C. § 110 (1926); MINN. STAT (Mason, 1927) § 8115; WIS. STAT.
(1927) c. 232, § 8; ALA. CIV. CODE (1923) § 6928; N. Y. CONS. LAwS
(Cahill, 1923) c. 51, § 149.
INSURANcE-CoNDITIoNs-Loss OF EYE BY "REMOVAL FROM BODY."-
The plaintiff was insured with the defendant under a policy providing
for indemnity against disability resulting from the loss of an eye by re-
moval of the eyeball from the body. .The plaintiff lost the sight of an
eye, but not by its removal from the body. In an action on the policy,
judgment was rendered for the defendant. Held, on appeal, that the
provision relative to the severance of the eye from the body was to be
merely evidentiary of loss of sight, and not a condition of responsibility.
Judgment reversed. Covington v. Sextet Local Mutual Aid A.s'n, 8 S. W.
(2d) 679 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
The clause in health insurance policies which provides for indemnity in
case of disability and "confinement to the house," is generally given a
liberal construction, on the ground that the words are not intended to
describe a course of conduct to be followed by the insured but are intended
to describe a condition of disability necessary for recovery. Aetna ife
Ins. Co. v. Willetts, 282 Fed. 26 (C. C. A. 3d, 1922). These clauses are
regarded as evidentiary rather than as conditions precedent to a duty to
pay, their purpose being to protect the insurance company against fraud.
Scales v. Masonic Prot,?ctive Ass'n, 70 N. H. 490, 48 Atl. 1084 (1900);
Jennings v. Brotherhood Ace. Co., 44 Colo. 68, 96 Pac. 982 (1908); Metro.
politan Plate Glass Ins. Co. v. Hawes, 150 Ky. 52, 149 S. W. 1110 (1912).
But see Dunning v. Mass. Mut. Ace. Ass'n, 99 Me. 390, 395, 59 Atl. 535,
537 (1904) (to hold this clause not a condition precedent is to defeat the
obvious intention disclosed by the terms employed). In construing acci-
dent policies insuring against the "loss of a hand," many courts take a
similar liberal view, holding that "loss of a hand" means loss of the use
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of the hand, and not actual physical severance. B.sincos M 's M112. Acn'n
v. Lockhart, 291 S. W. 658 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927). And even where the
clause read, "loss by severance of one entire hand," it was held that loss
of use was contemplated. Sneck v. Travellrs In7. Co. 88 Hun 91, 314
N. Y. Supp. 545 (Sup Ct. 1S95). Contra: Metropolitan CaawaltyJ In,. Co.
v. Shelby, 116 Miss. 278, 76 So. 839 (1917) (loss of use not sufficknt
to establish responsibility). Where a policy provided for indemnity for
burglary if "visible marks" were left upon the premises at the place of
entry, it was said that the purpose of the provision was to exclude "inside"
jobs and therefore it could be of no benefit to the defendant since the court
expressly found that the burglary was an "outside" job. See Bcrmard v.
Employer's Liability Co., 233 Ill. App. 229, 232 (1924). Contra: Fidelity
and Deposit Co. v. Spokane Intcrstatc Fair Assz, S F. (2d) 224 (C. C. A.
9th, 1925) (provision requiring "force and violence" to be used on a safe).
The cases indicate that unless insurance companies expressly negative
any possible inference that the clauses are evidentiary rather than limita-
tions on the risk, the courts incline to the former interpretation.
LANDLORD AND TENANT-COMiON PASSAGCVAYS--IESONsmlLITY FOn. It;-
.TuRms CAUSED BY SNow AND IcE.-The plaintiff, an employee of a tnant
in the defendant's building, suffered injury by a fall on snow and ice on
the common entry steps, and brought suit. Judgment vas .ivcn for the
plaintiff. Held, on appeal, that the landlord was under a duty t9 use
reasonable care to keep the passageway in a safe condition. Judgment
affirmed. United Shoe Corp. v. Paine, 26 F. (2d) 594 (C. C. A. 1st, 1923).
Where a landlord retains control of portions of leased premises for
the common use of the tenants he is under a duty to the tcnant- and
to all invitees to use reasonable care to keep such portion, in a safe
condition. Hahner v. Benider, 101 N. J. L. 102, 127 At. 202 (1921); I
TWFAY, IAN.DLORD AND TrNANT (1912) § S9a. But cf. Roecathwl v.
Bohedan Loan Ass'n, 192 Wis. 326, 212 N. W. 526 (1927). The under-
lying reason is that safe passage for the tenant and his social and busi-
ness visitors is essential to his beneficial enjoyment of the premite-. Sc2
Gleason v. Boehm, 58 N. J. L. 475, 477, 304 At. 8S6, SS7 (1896). Furthor-
more, the landlord as the party in control should be risponsible. Sce
Shindelbeck -. Moon, 32 Ohio St. 264, 267 (1,77). These rcasons Lcsm
to apply as cogently to snow and ice and similar temporary obstructions
as to structural defects. Thus many courts hold that the landlord's duty
extends to the removal of snow and ice from conmon approaches. Rcadgn
v. Shhiselwa, 102 Conn. 383, 128 Atl. 705, 39 A. L. R. 2.17 (1925); ef.
De Mateo v. Perano, 80 N. J. L. 437, 73 AtI. 162 (1910). But DMasZa-
chusetts and a few other jurisdictions do not impose on the landlord the
duty of removing from common passages temporary and natural dangers
such as snow and ice. Woods v. Naumdccag Cotton Co, 134 MaSs. 357
(1883); Oertcr -e. Ziegler, 59 Wash. 421, 109 Pac. 1058 (1910); ef. GCaoro
v. Lebowuicz, 251 lass. 477, 146 N. E. 699 (1925) (banana peel). Ap-
parently this rule originated from a failure to distinguish the caze of
common passages from premises under the exclusive control of the tenant.
See Purcell v. English, 86 Ind. 34, 42 (1832). It seems, also, to have
been based somewhat on the rule that the owner of land is nt baund
to keep a right of way in a safe condition. See Woods v,. Namzkcag Gotton
Co., supra at 360. But even lassachusetts will allow recovery if the
accumulation of ice was attributable to a defect in the premises, treating
the negligent omission to repair as equivalent to voluntarily and directly
causing the danger. Watkiw v. Goodall, 138 Mass. 523 (1835). The
instant case, in refusing to follow the Massachusetts rule, is in accord
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with what seems to be the sounder doctrine. Cf. Reardon v. Shirnelman,
supra.
PLEADING AND PRACTICE-AMENDMENT ON APPEAL-LIMITATION OF Ac-
TioNs.-The appellants appealed as executors whereas their capacity should
have been that of trustees. The appellees moved to dismiss, and the
appellants then petitioned for leave to amend. Held, that although the
Statute of Limitations would bar a new action, that fact does not prevent
an amendment changing the capacity in which the appellant sues, as
long as the cause of action is not changed. In re Kaufmann's Estate,
141 Atl. 852 (Pa. 1928).
At common law, faulty capacity was ground for arrest of judgment.
STEPHEN, PLEADING (Williston's ed. 1895) *107. The Statutes of Jeofails
and Amendments were passed to provide a remedy for this situation. CLARC,
CODE PLEADING (1928) 493. But even now, amendments introducing a
new cause of action will not be permitted after the Statute of Limita-
tions has run in favor of the defendant on the new cause. Sandwich Mfg.
Co. v. Bogie, 298 S. W. 56 (Mo. 1927). A few courts seem to be strict
in construing such amendments as introducing new causes of action. Davis
v. St. Paul Coal Co., 286 Ill. 64, 121 N. E. 181 (1918); (1919) 28
YALE L. J. 693; N. & (, Taylor Co. v. Anderson, 14 F. (2d) 353 (C.
C. A. 7th, 1926) (change of capacity); Comment (1927) 36 YALE L. 1. 853.
But the modern liberal tendency is readily discernible in the decisions
of the United States Supreme Court. Friedericksen v. Renard, 247 U. S.
207, 38 Sup. Ct. 450 (1918) (allowing an amendment from equity to law);
Missouri, Kaneas & Texas Ry. v. Wulf, 226 U, S. 570, 33 Sup. Ct. 135
(1912) (change of capacity-amendment allowed); Seaboard Air Line
Ry. v. Renn, 241 U. S. 290, 36 Sup. Ct. 567 (1916) (addition of an allega-
tion that the plaintiff was engaged in interstate commerce); "New York
Central Ry. v. Kinney, 260 U. S. 340, 43 Sup. Ct. 122 (1922) (amend-
ment from a common law or state statutory action to one under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act). In New York, under the Civil Prac-
tic6 Act, mistakes, omissions, defects or irregularities may be disregarded
or amended on appeal. N. Y. C. P. A. §§ 105, 109; Piotrowski v. Cervi,
210 App. Div. 681, 206 N. Y. Supp. 655, (4th Dep't 1924); Livingston
v. Livingston, 246 N. Y. 234, 158 N. E. 313 (1927). Amendments have
been allowed in other appellate courts where suits were brought in the
name of the wrong party. Lake Erie & W. R. R. v. Town of Boswelli
137 Ind. 336, 36 N. E. 1103 (1893); McDonald v. State, 101 Fed. 171
(C. C. A. 8th, 1900). Or where the name of a party was omitted.
Martin v. McAfee & Co., 31 Ga. App. 690, 122 S. E. 71 (1923); National
Surety Co. v. Leflore County, 262 Fed. 325 (C. C. A. 5th, 1919); Burke
v. Boulder Milling & Elevator Co., 76 Colo. 64, 230 Pac. 398 (1924). Also
where material facts and allegations in support of the original cause have
been omitted in the pleadings below. Tinker v. Sauer, 105 Ohio St. 135,
136 N. E. 854 (1922). But where amendments are made solely for the
purpose of delay there is reluctance in granting them. Cf. Wis. STAT.
(1927) c. 263, § 45. Such was not the purpose in the principal case.
Substantive rights should not be sacrificed for a technical error or defect
in pleading. Cf. McDonald v. State, supra at 174. The instant decision
seems to be in harmony with the modern liberal tendency which looks
more to the substance than to the form of the action. Cf. Reardon v.
Balaklala Consol. Copper Co., 193 Fed. 189, 194 (C. C. N. D. Cal. 1912);
Wulfers v. Clark Motor Co., 177 Wis. 497, 188 N. W. 652 (1922).
PUBLIC SERVICE LAW-CERTIFICATES OF CqNVENIENCE AND NECESSITY-
STRICT CONSTRUCTION OF EXEMPTION CIAUsES,-The California Public
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Utilities Act [CAL. CODES and GEN. LAwS (Supp. 1927) 1800 § 50 (d)]
forbids the operation of vessels on the inland waters of the state with-
out a certificate of public convenience and necessity, except as to termini
between -which persons are "actually operating vessels in good faith, at
the time thifs act becomes effective." A railroad had abandoned vehicular
ferry service between points A and B more than thirty-two years prior
to the effective date of the act, but was operating boats for the transporta-
tion of its train passengers between these points, and a vehicular ferry
between points A and C. The Railroad Commission decided that the rail-
road need not secure a certificate to operate a vehicular ferry betwecn
A and B. Held, that this order be annulled. Golden Gate Frerry Co. v,.
Railroad Comaission, 268 Pac. 355 (Cal. 1928).
The purpose of the prior-operation exemption clauses is to secura the
control of public carriers through certificates of public convenience and
necessity without unfairness to existing interests. See Motor Transit Co.
v. Railroad Commission, 189 Cal. 573, 5S5, 209 Pac. 580, 591 (1922).
They may be further justified on the ground that present successful opera-
tion is at least prima facie evidence that the public necessity and con-
venience require its continuance. Lilienthal and Rosenbaum, Motor C;-rikr
Regulation by Certificates of Necessity anzd Convenicnee (1926) 306 Y.=tn
L. J. 163, 181. "Abandonment' of service before the cffective date of
the act will generally destroy the privilege of operation without a cer-
tificate. Sandpoint Water & Light Co. v. Humbird Lumbcr Co., P. U. R.
1918B 535 (Idaho); Staley v. Public Utility Ccqm.iasion, 113 Ohio St.
627, 150 N. E. 84 (1925). But "periodic or irregular" departures from the
established service are disregarded. Holbacs 1. Railroad Cowwninsion, 197
Cal. 627, 242 Pac. 486 (1925); State v. Dep't of Public Work:, 127 Wash.
121, 219 Pac. 878 (1923). Furthermore, only operation similar to that
furnished prior to the act is permitted. Sheets Tazicab Co. v. Co;ai-aon-
wealth, 140 Va. 325, 125 S. E. 431 (1924) (cannot increase numbrr of
vehicles); Coast Truck Line v. Railroad Coiavzission, 191 Cal. 257, 215 Pac.
898 (1923) (must use same route); Re Red Ball Tranaportetion Co.. P. U.
R. 1923E 418 (Iowa) (service between two cities does not permit op~ra-
tion between one of these and an intermediate point). These holdings
indicate a strong tendency toward strict construction of the exemption
clauses in order to secure effective commission control to prevent unfair
and destructive competition among public utilities. In holding that the
operation of the railroad as set out did not satisfy the statutory rqoire-
ment of "prior operation in good faith," the decision is in accord with this
trend.
TORTS--NEGLGENCE-FoREEEABILITY op DANGER AS TIE TES'r -oa DUTY.
-The defendant-sold an electric sewing machine, with connecting cord, to
the plaintiff's mother. The plaintiff, an infant, took the cord in its mouth
and suffered severe burns due to defective insulation. The plaintiff re-
covered judgment. Held, on appeal, that the manufacturer, havin- failcd
properly to inspect the cord, was responsible for the injury. Judg ,Ant
affirmed. White Sewing Machine Co. -. Fcizsl, 162 N. E. 033 (Ohio 1927).
By the early view privity of contract was requisite to any duty on the
part of the manufacturer to the injured party. Wiztcrbottoa r v1 741t,
10 M. & W. 109 (1842). This rule was adopted by many court3 in this
country, and probably still prevails in England. See SzLmo0D, Lxw oF
ToRTs (7th ed. 1928) 481, 482; (1920) 18 Mimi. L. Ruv. 670, 673; (197)
40 HARV. L. RLV. 886, 888. It was soon avoided in extreme cases on the
ground of "imminent danger to life." Thomas v. Winchestcr, 6 N. Y. 397
(1852). This exception became accepted as an independent rule ."TePh. r-
son v. Buick Motor Car Co., 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 100 (1916); see
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Huset v. Case Threshing Machine Co., 120 Fed. 865, 868 (C. C. A. 8th,
1903). The duty is said to arise from foreseeability of danger. See Hcaven
v. Pender, 11 Q. B. D. 503, 509 (1883); McPherson v. Buick Motor Car Co.,
supra at 385, 11 N. E. at 1051. But foreseeability of danger is the gen-
erally accepted test of negligence in those situations where it is agreed
some lauty to exercise care exists, in the sense of violation of duty. See
BOHLEN, STUDIES IN THE LAw OF TORTS (1926) 1, 9. As such a test it
amounts to nothing more than a ritualistic formula for submitting the
question to the jury. Green, The Negligence Issue (1928) 37 YA~m L. J.
1029. It would seem strange that the same test should serve the judge in
defining legal duties. In fact, it is not believed that it does serve such
function, except as one of many factors which must be taken into account
in determining the limits of legal protection. Cf. Wagner v. International
Ry., 232 N. Y. 176, 133 N. E. 437 (1921); CARDOZO, PAnADOXES OF L.OAL
SCIENCE (1928) 56, 57, 58. The English courts have so far refused to ac-
cept such a rule as the basis of duty. Heaven v. Pender, supra; In ro
Polemis, [1921] 3 K. B. 560. Apparently due to anticipated administrative
difficulties, the English courts refused to impose any responsibility on the
manufacturer of a chattel for injury to third persons, despite the element
of danger. Winterbottam v. Wright, supra. These administrative diffi-
culties have not materialized in the American cases which have imposed
responsibility. And probably because of the desirability of preventing
hazards to life generally, rather than any foresecability of danger as a basis
of responsibility in the particular case, the American courts have been more
inclined to impose restrictions on the manufacturer. This is a much broader
basis for responsibility and gives support for the instant case where the
narrow rule of foresegability might equally well support a contrary judg-
ment.
TORTS-REAL PROPERTY-SLANDER OF TITLE.-After the execution of a
contract for the sale of certain lands by the plaintiff to X, the defendant
without any justification filed a lis penden. giving notice of a suit to subject
the property to the lien of a judgment against Y, alleging that the plaintiff
was merely trustee of the land for Y. As a result X refused to perform.
The defendant's suit was dismissed and the plaintiff proceeded against him
for slander of title. Held, that the plaintiff had suffered no damage since
he could secure specific performance or recover damages in a suit against
X for breach of contract. A motion to strike the complaint for failure to
state a cause of action was granted. Stiles v. Kuriloff, 141 Atl. 314 (N.
J. L. 1928).
When one wilfully induces a third person to commit a breach of contract,
such conduct is actionable. Wheeler-Stenzel Co. v. Am. Window Glass Co.,
202 Mass. 471, 89 N. E. 28 (1909); Lumley v. Gye, 2 El. & Bl. 216 (1853).
When breach of a contract between the plaintiff and a third person has
been procured by a slander of the plaintiff, recovery is allowed against the
slanderer on an averment of special damage. Moody v. Baker, 5 Cow.
351 (N. Y. 1826) (breach of a contract of marriage); of. Green ,. Button,
2 Cr. M. & R. 707 (1835) (breach of a contract for sale caused by falsely
asserting a lien). In the case of slander of title a different rule seems to
prevail. No recovery is allowed unless the loss of a sale to a particular
person is proved. Wilson v. Duboig, 35 Minn. 471, 29 N. W. 68 (1886).
Nor is it permitted where the negotiations, as in the instant case, have
ripened into a contract. In such a case the sole remedy is on the contract.
Burkett v. Griffith, 90 Cal. 532, 27 Pac. 527 (1891); Brentman v. Note, 3
N. Y. Supp. 420 (City Ct. 1889); See Paull v. Halferty, 63 Pa. 46, 51
(1869). Contra: Ashford v. Choate, 20 U. C. C. P. 471 (1870) (recovery
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allowed on facts similar to those of the instant case). This restriction has
been severely criticized. See Smith, Dksparagmcnt of Propcrty (1913)
13 COL. L. Ray. 121, 126. Although it may be explaincd by the different
historical development of slander of the person and slander of title, the
modern tendency is to recognize the kinship between them. The plaintiff
has lost the benefit of a present contract and incurred the trouble and e0x-
pense of litigation as a result of the defendant's wrong. It seems ques-
tionable to allow the wrongdoer to claim immunity merely because the
plaintiff may have an alternative remedy against a third perzon. See
BowEP, A CODE OF THE LAw or ACTIONABLE DrIx,=ATioz (1903) 314, 315.
